In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court is posed to rule on the following important employment law issues:
The employees in this case allege that Integrity requires post-shift security screenings lasting up to 25 minutes, yet fails to compensate them for the time spent undergoing the screenings, which is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Integrity claims that it is immune from liability under the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which provides that employers are not required to compensate for activities that are postliminary to an employee’s primary work activities.
The Ninth Circuit sided with the employees and ruled that the employees stated a plausible claim for relief because the security clearances were for Integrity’s benefit and necessary for the employees’ job performance. Specifically, the Court noted that the prevention of employee theft—a concern specific to the employees’ warehouse work duties—motivated the security clearances, thereby benefiting Integrity. Therefore, Integrity was required to compensate its employees for the time spent in the security screening.
UPDATE (12/9/2014) – The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the time spent undergoing a security screening is not compensable under the FLSA.
2. Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. – must an employer accommodate a pregnant woman with work restrictions related to pregnancy in the same manner as it accommodates a non-pregnant employee with the same restrictions?
UPS offered “light duty program” to workers who were injured on the job, but refused to provide any light duty accommodations to pregnant employees. Young challenged the policy and argued that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) requires an employer to provide pregnant employees light duty work if it provides similar work to other employees in other circumstances.
The Fourth Circuit sided with UPS and ruled that: (1) the employer did not “regard” a pregnant employee as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); and (2) employers are not required under the PDA to provide pregnant employees with light duty assignments so long as the employer treats pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees with respect to offering accommodations.
3. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. – does an employee have to provide a direct, explicit notice to the employer of the need for a religious accommodation?
In this case, EEOC has alleged that Abercrombie violated Title VII when it failed to hire a prospective employee, Samantha Elauf, because of her religious practice without offering her a reasonable accommodation. Elauf, a Muslim, interviewed for a sales position at Abercrombie while wearing a black hijab (headscarf), a practice inconsistent with Abercrombie’s policy prohibiting sales employees from wearing black clothing or “caps.” Although the assistant manager interviewing Elauf assumed that Elauf wore her hijab because she was Muslim, Elauf did not say that she needed to wear it for religious reasons or request a religious accommodation. There was evidence that Abercrombie did not hire Elauf because of her attire.
The Tenth Circuit sided with Abercrombie and explained that plaintiffs claiming religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate ordinarily must prove that they informed the employer that they engage in a particular practice for religious reasons and require an accommodation. It rejected the EEOC’s position that Title VII may be satisfied by notice short of an explicit communication from the applicant. The Tenth Circuit’s decision is in tension with decisions of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have adopted the EEOC’s position that the element of notice is established where the employer has actual knowledge of an employee or applicant’s religious practice even if there is no an explicit request for an accommodation.
Leiza Dolghih frequently advises employers on how to handle troublesome employees, assists with responding to EEOC charges, and litigates employment disputes. For more information, e-mail Leiza.Dolghih@GodwinLewis.com.