Common Misconceptions About Non-Competition Agreements in Texas 

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

A big part of my practice consists of enforcing non-competition, non-solicitation and non-disclosure agreements against the departing employees on behalf of their employers. Conversely, I also advise employees regarding what they can and cannot do in light of the non-competition or non-solicitation restrains imposed on them by their former employers.  Here is a quick list of misconceptions that I have encountered among employers and employees about non-competition agreements in Texas.

1.         Non-competition agreements are not enforceable in Texas.  This is false.  For some reason, a lot of employees still believe that non-competition agreements are not enforceable under Texas law. While this used to be the case roughly a decade ago, all through mid- and late-2000s, Texas courts have been slowly relaxing the requirements that an employer must meet in order to enforce a non-compete agreement. It used to be virtually impossible for an employer to enforce a non-competition agreement, but now as long as the restraints are “reasonable” and a few other requirements are met, a non-compete agreement will be upheld in court. A detailed explanation of the requirements can be found here.

Keep in mind that not all agreements for Texas employees are governed by Texas law. Each state has its own rules about the enforceability of non-competition agreements and, for example, an agreement that would be enforceable under Texas law, would not be enforceable under California law.  Typically, non-compete agreements will state which law governs. If they do not, a more detailed analysis will have to be performed to determine which state’s law applies and how it affects the restraints imposed on the employee.

2.         I never signed a “non-competition agreement,” therefore I can compete with the employer.  Employees rarely sign an actual contract titled “non-competition agreement.” Instead, non-competition clauses are often included in any number of documents, including employment agreements, arbitration agreements, benefits plans, stock option agreements, or employment handbooks and manuals. Thus, employees should carefully read every employment document they sign and keep the most current copy in their files.  When the time comes to leave the employer or start their own company, it helps to know exactly what the non-competition provisions state.

3.         A non-competition clause that is good for one employee is good for all employees.  This is false.  While simply including a non-competition or non-solicitation clause in an agreement often deters employees from competing against their former employers, when push comes to shove and an employer is forced to sue its former employee for violating his or her non-compete agreement, Texas courts will look at whether the restraints imposed by such agreements are “reasonable.”  As part of this analysis, they will consider what duties the employee performed, which customers he or she worked with, what geographic area his or her work covered, and many other factors.  Since this is a very factually intensive analysis, non-compete restraints that might be reasonable for one employee might be completely unreasonable for another employee. Thus, including a cookie-cutter non-compete clause in all of your employees’ contracts might not adequately protect the company’s interests. This does not mean, of course, that an employer must draft a different non-compete clause for each employee, but it does mean that certain positions or certain levels of employees within the company might need different clauses than other types of employees.

4.        Texas courts can always rewrite or “fix” a non-competition clause that is too broad. While technically this is true, practically speaking this kind of thinking can cost an employer a lot of money down the line.  First, employees are much more likely to challenge or violate a non-competition agreement that contains broad or unreasonable restraints because they think it is unenforceable or because they feel that it leaves them no choice by to violate it.  Second, an employer who knowingly attempts to enforce an unreasonable non-competition agreement may end up paying the restrained employee’s attorney’s fees if a court finds that the agreement was unreasonable. See a prior detailed discussion here.

BOTTOM LINE: Employers should attempt to craft non-competition clauses that take into consideration their industry, employees’ duties, the geographic area where employees will be working, and the time limitation that can be justified in court as necessary to protect the business of the company. While it might be tempting to draft a non-compete or non-solicitation clause that is broader than is necessary such approach can backfire if the employee decides to challenge the agreement in court.

Employees should carefully read and make sure they understand and agree with the non-competition or non-solicitation clauses contained in their employment documents.  They should assess the effect of the clause on their employment opportunities after they leave their current employer. If the clause is not clear, they should seek clarification in writing from the employer explaining the geographic scope, time limitations and the scope of restrained activities covered by the non-competition or non-solicitation clause.

For more information regarding non-competition agreements in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.

 

A Split Among Texas Courts Regarding Whether Current Employers Should be Included in Temporary Injunction Applications

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

Last month, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed the following issue: must an employer who is enforcing a non-compete agreement against a departed employee add the employee’s new employer as a defendant in order to obtain a temporary injunction? The Court found that the new employer must be joined as a party, but not before highlighting the split in authority on this issue.

In Down Time-South Texas, LLC v. ElpsDown Time applied for a temporary injunction seeking to enforce a non-competition agreement signed by its former employee, Elps. At the temporary injunction hearing, Elps’s attorney argued that Down Time should not be allowed to put on evidence to support its application because the agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) it lasted indefinitely; and (2) Elps’s current employer had not been made a party to the suit.  The trial court adjourned the hearing to consider the legal questions raised, and before Down-Time was able to submit any evidence in support of its temporary injunction application, the court denied the application. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial and held that Elps’s current employer should have been made a defendant.

The Court explained that on the one hand, two Texas Courts of Appeals have previously ruled that a temporary injunction does not require the applicant to join the current employer.  In Whittier Heights Main. Ass’n v. Colleyville Home Owners’ Rights Ass’n  (an unpublished opinion), the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the joinder of all necessary parties before issuing a temporary injunction was not required. Similarly, the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Winslow v. Duval County Ranch Co., ruled that a joinder of all necessary parties was not a condition precedent to the issuance of a temporary injunction.

On the other hand, in 1959, the Texas Supreme Court in Scott v. Graham held “that refusal of a temporary injunction when there is an absence of necessary parties, who might readily be joined in the suit, cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion.”  The San Antonio Court of Appeals took a similar approach in Bourland v. City of San Antonioreversing an order granting temporary injunction because only four of forty-six officers were joined in suit.  Likewise, the Waco Court of Appeals in Bays v. Wright held that it is a “well settled rule that in a suit of this kind to cancel a contract or to restrain the enforcement thereof, all parties to such contract are necessary parties to the suit.”

The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in Down-Time followed the Texas Supreme Court‘s long-standing precedent and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Dresser-Rand was a necessary party whose absence from the case precluded a grant of a temporary injunction.  The Court reasoned that because the requested temporary and then permanent injunction prohibited Elps from working for Dresser-Rand, the injunctive relief affected the employment relationship between Dresser-Rand and Elps.  Thus, the relief requested by Down-Time, “if it were granted, would have the direct effect of enjoining both Dresser-Rand and Elps from performing under their existing employment contract.”  The Court concluded that “under these circumstances” the requested relief was against both Dresser-Rand and Elps.  Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Dresser-Rand was a necessary party.

CONCLUSION: Employers seeking enforcement of non-compete agreements should carefully consider the pros and cons of adding the current employer as a defendant.  However, they should realize that some Texas courts, including the Thirteenth Court of Appeals, make it clear that adding the new employer is not an option, but a prerequisite to obtaining a temporary injunction.  Thus, depending on where the lawsuit is filed in Texas and what type of relief is requested, the enforcing party might not have a choice but to add the current employer as a defendant.

For more information regarding non-competition agreements in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.

An Employer Cannot Prohibit Its Employees From Discussing “Personnel Issues”

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

In the last few years, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been declaring unenforceable one confidentiality policy after another, forcing employers to balance their need to protect their confidential information and trade secrets against the right of employees to freely discuss the terms of their employment.  So, how should a business draft its confidentiality policy so that it serves its purpose, but does not land the company in hot water with the NLRB?  Last week’s Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals‘ decision in Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C., et al. v. National Labor Relations Board provides some useful guidance.

In this case, the confidentiality provision in question prohibited Flex Frac’s employees from sharing “confidential information” outside the organization. Such “confidential information” included, but was not limited to, the company’s marketing processes, plans and ideas, financial information, costs, prices, business plans, and “personnel information and documents.”

When Kathy Lopez, Flex Frac’s employee was fired, she filed a charge with the NLRB, prompting the Acting General Counsel for the Board to file a complaint, alleging, inter alia, that Flex Frac promulgated and maintained a rule prohibiting employees from discussing employee wages in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The administrative law judge found that the confidentiality clause violated Section 8(a)(1) because it was overly broad and contained language employees could reasonably interpret as restricting their exercise of their Section 7 rights. In a split decision, the NLRB affirmed.  Flex Frac appealed, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed as well.

The Court of Appeals explained that under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, it is an “unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”  Such rights include self-organization;  forming, joining, and assisting labor organizations; collective bargaining; and engaging “in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 28 U.S.C. § 157. Thus, a “workplace rule that forbids the discussion of confidential wage information between employees . . . patently violates Section 8(a)(1).”

Even if the workplace rule or policy does not expressly prohibit discussion of such information, it may still violate Section 8(a)(1) if the employees would reasonably construe the language of the policy to prohibit Section 7 activity.  Because the confidentiality clause at question in Flex Frac prohibited discussion of all “personnel information” and did not create an exception for discussion of wages, according to the Fifth Circuit, employees could reasonably construe its language as prohibition against discussion of wages or other terms and conditions of employment.

Importantly, the Fifth Circuit differentiated the Flex Frac policy from the confidentiality clauses upheld in the following cases:

  • Policy prohibited disclosure of “hotel-private information to employees or other individuals or  entities that are not authorized to receive that information,” but did not define “hotel-private information.” Held not to violate the NLRA because employees would reasonably interpret it to protect customers’ information and not interfere with discussion of their wages. Lafayette Park Hotel, K-Mart, 330 N.L.R.B. 263 (1999).
  • Policy stated that “Company business and documents are confidential. Disclosure of such information is prohibited.” Held not to violate the NLRA for the same reason. Lafayette Park Hotel, K-Mart, 330 N.L.R.B. 263 (1999).
  • Policy prohibited employees from disclosing “proprietary information . . . includ[ing] . . . customer and employee information, includ[ing] organizational charts and databases [and] financial information.” Held not to violate the NLRA because “employee information” was listed as an example of “intellectual property,” and would be reasonably interpreted by employees not to include information related to the terms and conditions of their employment or their wages since those are not considered “intellectual property.”  In re Mediaone of Greater Fla., Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 277 (2003).

Unlike the confidentiality policies in these cases, the Flex Frac policy prohibited disclosure of specifically “personnel information” and failed to clarify that such information did not include “wages.” Thus, the company employees could reasonably interpret “personnel information” to include the terms and conditions of the their employment. The Fifth Circuit noted in a footnote, however, that the NLRB‘s order did not impair the majority of the company’s confidentiality policy and nothing prevented Flex Frac from redrafting its policy to require confidentiality for employee-specific information such as social security numbers, medical records, background criminal checks, drugs test, or other similar information.

The Flex Frac opinion was issued a little over a month after NLRB struck down another employer’s confidentiality policy that prohibited disclosure of “personal or financial information.” The NLRB in MCPc, Inc. v. Jason Galanter, 360 NLRB 39 (2014) found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining an overly broad confidentiality rule in its employee handbook stating that “dissemination of confidential information within [the company], such as personal or financial information, etc., will subject the responsible employee to disciplinary action or possible termination.”  The Board found that employees would reasonably construe this rule to prohibit discussion of wages or other terms and conditions of employment with their coworkers—activity protected by Section 7.

BOTTOM LINE: In light of the above NLRB decisions and the Flex Frac opinion, employers should review their confidentiality policies to ensure that they are drafted to encompass only trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information rather than information that could relate to wages and other terms and conditions of employment.

For assistance in drafting or auditing your company’s confidentiality policy, contact Leiza Dolghih.

The Fifth Circuit Addresses the Texas Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Commercial Speech Exemption for the First Time

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

Three years ago, Texas enacted its own anti-SLAPP statute, appropriately titled the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Since then, many defendants have taken advantage of the TCPA‘s quick dismissal procedure when confronted with suits for defamation, business disparagement, or other claims arising out of the defendants’ exercise of their right of free speech, right to petition, and right to association. Because the statute is so new, however, many of the issues surrounding its application in Texas have not yet percolated through the appellate level, which makes the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals‘ analysis of the “commercial speech” exemption under the TCPA last week in NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C. particularly important.[1]

Factual Background

NCDR, LLC d/b/a Kool Smiles is a national chain of dental clinics. Mauze & Bagby is a personal injury law firm in San Antonio, Texas. In 2012, the law firm began an advertising campaign seeking to represent former Kool Smiles patients in a lawsuit against the chain. As part of this campaign, M&B ran television, radio, and internet advertisements, and developed a website that strongly implied, or even accused, Kool Smiles of performing unnecessary and/or harmful dental work on children to obtain government reimbursements.

Kool Smiles sued M&B, asserting, among other claims, business disparagement, defamation, and injury to business reputation. The law firm moved to dismiss the suit under the TCPA arguing that its campaign was a protected expression of free speech. However, both the trial court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that M&B was not entitled to the protection afforded by the TCPA because its advertisements were commercial speech.

The TCPA and the Commercial Speech Exemption

The purpose of the TCPA is to protect the right of people “to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.002. To achieve this, the TCPA provides that if a legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss the lawsuit within sixty days of being served with the complaint. Id. § 27.003(a). Only very limited discovery is allowed until the court rules on the motion to dismiss. Id.

The TCPA requires the court to dismiss the lawsuit if the defendant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association. Id. § 27.005(a)–(b). In order to avoid the dismissal, the plaintiff must establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of each claim. Id. § 27.005(c).

The “commercial speech” exemption to the TCPA disallows this quick dismissal procedure when:

. . . a legal action [was] brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, [and] the statement or conduct arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product or a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.010(b).

The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis

The Fifth Circuit looked at four cases decided by the Texas Courts of Appeals that addressed the commercial speech exemption. Two addressed whether a defendant’s action “arises out of the sale or lease of goods, services, or an insurance product.” The other two address whether the intended audience is “an actual or potential buyer or customer.” In all four cases, the courts of appeals found that the commercial speech exemption did not apply.

  • In Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., the First Court of Appeals held that the newspaper articles exposing compliance problems at Crazy Hotel and published by Newspaper Holdings did not “arise out of the sale of the goods and services” that the newspaper sold – newspapers. The commercial speech exemption, therefore, did not apply and the Court granted the newspaper’s motion to dismiss under the TCPA.
  • In Pena v. Parel, the Eighth Court of Appeals held that a letter to a parole board from a client’s attorney did not arise from “the sale of goods, services or insurance product.”

After analyzing the above-listed cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that this case was different and that M&B’s statements made in the advertising materials constituted commercial speech because they: (1) arose out of the sale of M&B’s legal services, and (2) were intended for M&B’s potential customers – people who had used Kool Smiles’ services and who wanted to file a lawsuit against them.

Takeaway

The Texas Citizens Participation Act is still very new and the case law interpreting the statute is still developing. However, the NCDR decision strongly suggests that any business advertisements directed at the current or potential clients are not protected by the TCPA.  Thus, a business whose advertisements contains negative statements about another business or individual should consider the possibility that it will not be able to use the TCPA to quickly dismiss a defamation or a business disparagement lawsuit arising out of such statements if one is filed.

For more information regarding defamation and business disparagement claims in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.


[1] While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals‘ analysis of the TCPA is not binding on the Texas state courts per se, it is instructive since the Court must “interpret[] the state statute the way the state supreme court would, based on prior precedent, legislation, and relevant commentary.” Since the Texas Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the TCPA, the Fifth Circuit‘s analysis of the “commercial speech” exemption is the next best thing.

Employers Should Take Care Not to Waive Non-Compete or Non-Solicitation Clauses Through Post-Employment Actions

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

It is not uncommon for employers to include a non-compete/non-solicitation (NCNS) covenant in their benefit plans or stock option agreements. Either agreement can then make the payments due to the employee conditional upon his or her compliance with the NCNS. In those cases where the payments are scheduled to be made after the employee leaves, such arrangement provides an extra incentive for the employee to comply with the NCNS covenant.

The employers that chose to follow this route, however, need to be aware that a payment made to an employee pursuant to a benefit plan or a stock option agreement after the employer discovers that the employee is violating his or her NCNS, can waive employer’s rights to later enforce the NCNS in court.

In Ally Financial, Inc. v. Gutierrez, et al., Ally’s employee, Gutierrez, signed a “Long-Term Equity Compensation Incentive Plan” (CIP) under which she would receive award payments based on Ally’s common stock value. The CIP included the following non-solicitation clause:

While the Participant is employed by the Company or a Subsidiary, and during the 2-year period immediately following the date of any termination of the Participant’s employment with the Company or a Subsidiary, such Participant shall not at any time, directly or indirectly, whether on behalf of . . . herself or any other person or entity (i) solicit any client and/or customer of the Company or any Subsidiary with respect to a Competitive Activity or (ii) solicit or employ any employee of the Company or any Subsidiary, or any person who was an employee of the Company or any subsidiary during the 60-day period immediately prior to the Participant’s termination, for the purpose of causing such employee to terminate his or her employment with the Company or such Subsidiary.

While at Ally, Guttierez received several CIP award letters that described a deferred payment schedule spanning from 2009 until 2015. In 2011, she left to work for Ally’s competitor, Homeward. Soon after her departure, eight of Ally’s employees went to work for Homeward as well, prompting Ally to send Gutierrez a letter accusing her of soliciting at least four of its employees and warning her that Ally was prepared to take a necessary “enforcement action.” The letter also stated that any violation of any contractual restrictive covenants would result in the forfeiture of “any Award that has not yet been paid” and require Guiterrez to “repay any Award Payments made within 24-months of an enforcement action.”

After sending the letter and after four more Ally’s employees went to work for Homeward, Ally paid Gutierrez her next payment due under the CIP.  When even more employees left, Ally filed a lawsuit against Gutierrez and Homeward and alleged claims for unfair competition, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with employment relations, conspiracy, and misappropriation of trade secrets.

Gutierrez and Homeward argued that the covenant was unenforceable as overly broad and unrelated to Ally’s business and, in the alternative, that Ally waived its right to seek its enforcement.  The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds of waiver and the Second Court of Appeals affirmed.[1]

The Court of Appeals explained that under Texas law, waiver is an affirmative defense requiring a defendant to proffer evidence conclusively establishing the following: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a party, (2) the party’s actual  knowledge of its existence, and (3) the party’s actual intent to relinquish, or intentional conduct inconsistent with, the right. Gutierrez and Homeward argued that the payment under the 2009 award letter was an intentional relinquishment of, or intentional conduct inconsistent with, Ally’s intent to enforce the non-solicitation covenant.  Ally responded that a payment to Gutierrez was “nothing more than a ministerial act,” but the Court of Appeals rejected that argument as “unpersuasive.”

According to the Court of Appeals‘ reasoning, the warning letter from Ally demonstrated that Ally was aware at the time it made the payment to Gutierrez that she was allegedly violating the non-solicitation covenant contained in the CIP.  By making the payment, Ally “represented to Gutierrez that although it believed she had violated the CIP and had forfeited her rights to all unvested payments by voluntarily resigning, it was awarding her incentive compensation as provided by the CIP.”  Making such payment, therefore, was inconsistent with Ally’s previously stated intention to enforce the non-solicitation covenant and with the terms of the CIP and was more than a ministerial act.

CONCLUSION:  There are two practical lessons that employers can derive from this case. First, when dealing with departing employees who are due any sort of payments after their employment is terminated, the companies should make sure that the department responsible for payments and the legal department coordinate with each other.  It is entirely possible that in Ally’s case the department making the payment was not aware of the warning letter sent to Gutierrez.

Second, while sending a cease and desist letter to a departed employee does not necessarily require involvement of a law firm or an in-house attorney (although it certainly gives it more clout), any actions that a business takes after sending a cease and desist letter should involve legal counsel to make sure that such actions will not negatively impact the employer’s case should she or he decide to sue the departing employee.

For more information regarding protection of trade secrets and enforcement of non-compete agreements in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.


[1] Although the CIP was governed by Michigan law, the Court of Appeals held that Texas and Michigan law were “functionally the same” on the issue of non-compete covenants and waivers, therefore, it did not need to decide which law applied to this dispute.

A Temporary Injunction Order Enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement in Texas Must Pass the Muster of Rule 683 or Face Dissolution

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

All temporary injunctions in Texas must comply with Rule 683 of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires every injunctive order to “set forth the reasons for its issuance; [] be specific in terms; [and] describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.” A temporary injunction order that fails to meet these requirements is subject to being dissolved.

Within the last four months, at least three Texas Courts of Appeals dissolved temporary injunctions seeking to enforce non-competition agreements because they failed to comply with Rule 683.  Most recently, the First Court of Appeals in Lasser v. Amistco Separation Products, Inc. dissolved a temporary injunction order that sought to enforce contractual non-compete and non-solicitation obligations because the order was both not specific enough and overbroad. This opinion, along with Ramirez, et al. v. Ignite Holdings Ltd., et al. (see my prior post here), provide a good example of what language falls short of meeting Rule 683 requirements.

In Lasser, ACS Industries, LP hired Robert Lasser to work in sales. His employment contract contained a confidentiality and non-solicitation clause, which prohibited Lasser from copying or using for his personal benefit ACS’s “confidential information,” as defined in the employment contract. It also forbade Lasser from “directly or indirectly, or by action in concert with others, engage in the solicitation of sales of competing goods to customers of ACS” for a period of two years from the contract’s termination. ACS later sold its assets, including Lasser’s employment contract, to plaintiff, Amistco Separation Products. Lasser worked for Amistco for a year before leaving to work for a competitor.

A month after Lasser resigned, Amistco sued him for conversion (of confidential information), civil theft, and misappropriation of trade secrets. The company requested the trial court to issue a temporary and permanent injunction against Lasser ordering him to return the confidential information that he had downloaded prior to his departure, enjoining him from disclosing and using such information, and preventing him from soliciting customers.

The trial court granted Amistco’s application for temporary injunction and issued the following order:

It is . . . ORDERED Defendant Robert Lasser desist and refrain from the following:

a) [Lasser] is ordered to return to [Amistco], and to cease and desist from using, any of [Amistco’s] confidential information and trade secrets within 14 days or as otherwise agreed by counsel.

b) [Lasser] is restrained from directly or indirectly disclosing, copying or otherwise reproducing, or giving others access to any of [Amistco] confidential information and trade secrets.

c) [Lasser] is restrained from deleting any emails, texts, voice messages, instant messaging communications (to include without limitation, instant messages using Google Talk, AOL Instant Messenger, Yahoo Messenger, or any other instant messaging platform), or any other electronic files or communications from his personal or work computers, laptops, phones, electronic storage devices and/or any other electronic device, or from, damaging, selling or otherwise discarding his personal or work computers, laptops, phones, electronic storage devices and/or any other electronic device in [Lasser]’s possession.

d) [Lasser] is restrained from directly or indirectly soliciting any of [Amistco's] customers.

In analyzing the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a temporary injunction order must do two things to comply with Rule 683‘s specificity requirements: (1) it should inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing, without calling on him for inferences or conclusions about which persons might well differ and without leaving anything for further hearing; and (2) it may not prohibit lawful activities.  The injunctive order in question failed to meet both of these mandates.

First, parts (a) and (b) of the order failed to “identify, define, explain, or otherwise describe” what constituted “confidential information” that Lasser was prohibited from disclosing. Thus, these provisions did not provide adequate notice to Lasser as to what conduct he was restrained from performing and left him to speculate what conduct might satisfy or violate the order.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals declared Parts (a) and (b) void.

The Court also found that Part (c) was impermissibly ovebroad under Rule 683 because it enjoined activities that Lasser had a legal right to perform, such as deleting electronic records and files unrelated to the subject of the lawsuit. Therefore, it vacated this provision.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Part (d) of the order, which restrained Lasser “from directly or indirectly soliciting any of [Amistco's] customers” was also overbroad.  Whereas the non-solicitation clause in Lassiter’s contract prohibited him from engaging in solicitation of sales of competing goods to Amistco’s customers, the temporary injunction order enjoined Lasser from soliciting any sales to Amistco’s customers. Thus, the order precluded Lasser from engaging in lawful business of selling non-competing goods to Amistco’s customers. The Court declared this provision void as well and ordered the entire temporary injunction dissolved.

CONCLUSION: When preparing for a temporary injunction hearing, the party seeking an injunction and its attorneys should make sure that the proposed order that they would like the judge to sign is specific enough to give the other side a clear notice of what they can and cannot do once the order is entered.  At the very least, the order should define what constitutes “confidential information” or “trade secrets” that the party is seeking to protect. Sloppy and generic language can result in the injunction being void.

Furthermore, a temporary injunction order cannot prohibit lawful activities. In that regard, it should trail the language of the non-competition and non-solicitation agreement closely. While it is tempting to overreach and ask for more restrictions that the original agreement allowed (especially if the judge is willing to grant it), including such language in the order can result in its dissolution on appeal.

For more information regarding protection of trade secrets and enforcement of non-compete agreements in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.

Two More Texas Courts of Appeals Find An Arbitration Waiver In Light of Litigation Conduct

Dallas Business Litigation Attorney

Leiza Dolghih
Attorney, Godwin Lewis PC

Last November, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s ruling that a party who substantially participated in litigation had waived its arbitration rights under an otherwise valid and enforceable arbitration clause. Yesterday, both the First Court of Appeals and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston reached a similar conclusion.

Like Ideal Roofing, decided last November, the lawsuit in Tuscan Builders, L.P. v. 1437 SH6 L.L.C, et al., involved a construction contract. The First Court of Appeals applied the same five-factor test used by the Dallas Court of Appeals, with the addition of one more criterion – whether the movant for arbitration was the plaintiff (who chose to file in court) or the defendant (who merely responded). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order finding that the defendant had substantially invoked the litigation process and his actions were inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, as demonstrated by the following:

  • Tuscan, while being a defendant in the lawsuit, proceeded to file a third-party lawsuit against other parties.
  • Tuscan moved for arbitration after the parties had completed written discovery, including expert designations and information, and had conducted a property inspection.
  • Tuscan had joined in the motions prolonging discovery and postponed the trial date and mediation deadline to allow the parties to pursue additional discovery on the merits.
  • It was Tuscan’s construction contract that referenced an industry form that contained an arbitration clause, indicating that Tuscan probably knew that such clauses existed prior to filing the lawsuit.
  • Other parties to the lawsuit were not aware of the arbitration clause because they did not receive a copy of the industry referenced in the contract.
  • Tuscan moved to compel arbitration more than a year after the suit was filed and when the trial setting was less than a month away.

When determining whether a party has waived its arbitration rights, a court must look at “the totality of circumstances.” In addition to the individual factors described above, the Court of Appeals found that Tuscan’s overall litigation strategy, such as bringing its subcontractors into the lawsuit in order to have access to discovery responses obtained by them as aligned parties, and obtaining a building inspection, allowed Tuscan to take advantage of litigation strategies that would not have been available in arbitration. Therefore, such a deliberate tactical approach was inconsistent with any intent to arbitrate.

The Court of Appeals also found that Tuscan’s invocation of the litigation process prejudiced the plaintiff who, not knowing that an arbitration clause existed, spent a significant amount of time and money litigating the case in what it considered to be a proper forum.

The same day that the First Court of Appeals found that the defendant in Tuscan Builder  waived its arbitration rights, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reached a similar result in RSL Funding LLC v. Chaveze D. Pippins, et al., which involved an assignment of annuity contracts.

In this case, three individual defendants bought annuity from MetLife and subsequently executed contracts assigning their rights to RSL. The original annuity contracts between the individuals and MetLife did not contain an arbitration clause, but the assignment agreements with RSL did. When MetLife refused to pay RSL under the annuity contracts, RSL filed a lawsuit against both MetLife and the individuals.

Initially, RSL’s and the individuals’ interests seemed to be aligned since both wanted MetLife to pay RSL on the annuity contracts. However, once MetLife deposited the funds due under the annuity contracts in the court’s registry, the RSL and the individual defendants seemed to disagree as to who should receive such money and the individuals moved to withdraw the funds.  RSL promptly filed an arbitration demand against the individuals based on the arbitration clause in their assignment contract and moved to stay the litigation.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of the stay of litigation on the grounds that RSL substantially invoked the litigation process and the individual defendants were prejudiced by such invocation, thus resulting in a waiver of RSL’s arbitration rights under the assignment contract. Justice Kem Thompson Frost dissented.

The Courts of Appeals added three more criteria for determining whether a waiver has occurred, in addition to those already enumerated in Ideal Roofing and Tuscan Builders:

  • whether the party who pursued arbitration sought or opposed arbitration earlier in the case
  • whether the party who pursued arbitration filed affirmative claims or dispositive motions
  • what discovery would be unavailable in arbitration

The Court noted that all of the waiver factors are rarely present in a single case, thus a waiver could be established based only on a few or even a single factor.  Instead of addressing each of the criteria, it concluded in broad strokes that RSL had invoked the litigation process because of the following actions:

  • it filed the lawsuit not only against MetLife, but also against the individuals with whom it had an arbitration agreement
  • when the individuals filed a counterclaim against RSL, the plaintiff did not move to compel arbitration, although it would have been appropriate to do so at that time
  • when the individual defendants non-suited their counterclaims and refiled them in another court, RSL waited 2 ½ months before filing a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of the arbitration
  • RSL filed a partial motion for summary judgment against both MetLife and the individual defendants on the same issue it sought to arbitrate

Furthermore, RSL’s invocation of the litigation process substantially prejudiced the individual defendants because they were forced to file numerous pleadings and motions in the trial court that they would not have needed to do had the case proceeded to arbitration. Furthermore, RSL’s failure to pay the individual defendants the amount that it owed under the assignment contracts while the litigation was proceeding put a significant financial constraint on them.

What makes this case different from Ideal Roofing and Tuscan Builders, however, is that in both of those lawsuits, the parties’ pattern of litigation activities established rather clearly that they took full advantage of discovery and other litigation procedures before seeking arbitration in the eleventh hour before trial.  In RSL Funding, however, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, RSL’s litigation tactics were directed at MetLife, with whom it did not have an arbitration agreement, and not at the individual co-defendants.  Moreover, at the time RSL filed the lawsuit there were no disputes between itself and the individuals under any of the assignment agreements, and RSL added them as defendants only to obtain a full resolution of the rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act.  The arbitrable claims between RSL and the individual defendants did not arise until after the defendants had filed a motion to withdraw funds from the court registry, at which point RSL promptly filed an arbitration demand. 

CONCLUSION: While Ideal Roofing and Tuscan Builders suggest that a party has to conduct extensive discovery, participate in motion practice, and delay an arbitration demand until the eve of trial in order to cause a waiver of its arbitration rights, RSL Funding  indicates that a waiver can occur far earlier in the litigation process and be caused by far less rigorous participation in a lawsuit.

Thus, anytime a party finds itself pursuing or defending a lawsuit involving claims that might be covered by an arbitration clause, the party should plan its litigation strategy very carefully so as to avoid a waiver of its arbitration rights.

For more information regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements in Texas, contact Leiza Dolghih.

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